The Legal and Political Imperatives of an All Southern Cameroons Conference: A Rejoinder

By McFarlane Njoh, J.D.

Introduction

Dr. Fontem Neba has provided a thoughtful analysis of the political trajectories of the former British Southern Cameroons and of the lessons that may be drawn from the All Anglophone Conferences of 1993 and 1994. His proposal for a new All Southern Cameroons Conference deserves serious consideration not merely as another political initiative, but as an opportunity to reconnect the political question with principles of law, human rights, representation, and collective political agency.

The central questions are therefore twofold: what is the legal justification for such a Conference, and why is it politically important now? The purpose of the Conference should not be to predetermine the constitutional future of the Southern Cameroons. Its legitimacy would instead derive from its capacity to create a lawful, representative, inclusive, and deliberative forum in which competing political visions may be articulated, examined, and debated by those whose political future is directly implicated.

The legal foundation for such a Conference is not found in a single provision expressly creating a right to convene an “All Southern Cameroons Conference.” Rather, it emerges from the cumulative protection of freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, political participation, and peoples’ rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Articles 9, 10, 11, and 13 protect the civic and political space necessary for collective deliberation, while Articles 19 and 20 provide the broader framework governing equality, peoples’ rights, and self-determination.

The Legal Foundation

Article 9 of the African Charter protects the right to receive information and to express and disseminate opinions within the law. Article 10 protects freedom of association. Article 11 guarantees the right to assemble freely with others, subject only to restrictions prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Article 13 recognizes every citizen’s right to participate freely in the government of his or her country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives.

These rights are mutually reinforcing. Political participation is impossible without the ability to exchange ideas. Political association provides organizational structure to those ideas. Peaceful assembly creates the space within which collective concerns may be articulated and debated. The proposed Conference can therefore be understood as an exercise in political association and collective deliberation. Its creation would not, by itself, determine the territory’s constitutional status, nor would it require participants to endorse a particular political outcome. Rather, it would create a structured mechanism through which competing constitutional visions may be considered through dialogue rather than coercion.

This distinction is fundamental. The right to deliberate concerning collective political futures is distinct from any asserted right to impose a predetermined political settlement. A Conference that facilitates participation, representation, and discussion does not answer the constitutional question in advance; it establishes conditions in which that question may be addressed peacefully and democratically.

The jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights supports this understanding. In Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, Communications Nos. 147/95 and 149/96, the Commission held that measures restricting political participation, freedom of association, assembly, and expression violated multiple provisions of the Charter. The decision reflects a broader principle: meaningful political life requires the preservation of civic space within which citizens may organize, associate, deliberate, and articulate political preferences. The protection of these rights is not merely individual; it is essential to democratic governance itself.

Similarly, in Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, the Commission emphasized that the freedoms of expression, association, and participation are indispensable components of democratic society. The Charter protects not only individual speech but the institutional and collective mechanisms through which public participation occurs.

Deliberative Self-Determination and Democratic Legitimacy

The individual rights protected under Articles 9 through 13 must also be read alongside the African Charter’s distinctive recognition of peoples’ rights.

Article 19 affirms that all peoples are equal and enjoy the same respect and rights. Article 20 recognizes the right of all peoples to existence and self-determination, including the right freely to determine their political status and to pursue their economic and social development according to policies of their own choosing.

These provisions require careful interpretation. Article 20 does not, by itself, resolve the constitutional status of the Southern Cameroons. Nor should it be invoked as though international law has already answered the questions that remain politically contested. Its importance lies elsewhere. It confirms that questions concerning collective political status, governance, and institutional design fall within the sphere of protected human rights discourse.

Contemporary understandings of self-determination increasingly recognize that the concept possesses a participatory dimension. Self-determination is not limited to claims of statehood, secession, federation, or confederation. It also encompasses the ability of a people collectively to deliberate concerning the political institutions through which they are governed.

On this understanding, the significance of an All Southern Cameroons Conference lies not in any predetermined outcome but in the democratic process itself. Its legitimacy derives from its capacity to facilitate informed, representative, and peaceful deliberation concerning competing constitutional alternatives. Whether participants favour federalism, confederal arrangements, enhanced autonomy, independence, or another constitutional model, the Conference provides a venue through which those alternatives may be debated through democratic engagement rather than political exclusion.

Human Rights, Participation, and Civic Space

Where substantial populations maintain longstanding grievances concerning representation, institutional arrangements, cultural and linguistic rights, equality, and participation in public affairs, those concerns implicate questions of rights and institutional accountability. The human-rights framework therefore strengthens the case for representative mechanisms through which grievances may be articulated peacefully.

The jurisprudence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is instructive.

In Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Rwanda, the Court reaffirmed the importance of political expression and emphasized that restrictions upon political speech must satisfy requirements of necessity and proportionality. Political expression occupies a privileged position in democratic society because it facilitates public debate concerning matters of collective concern.

Likewise, in Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso, the Court held that restrictions on freedom of expression must be proportionate to a legitimate objective and necessary in a democratic society. The judgment underscores a broader principle applicable beyond the specific facts of the case: limitations upon civic participation require careful justification and cannot be imposed simply because political views are controversial or inconvenient.

These authorities do not concern a Southern Cameroons Conference. Their significance lies in the principles they establish. Political expression, peaceful organization, and participation in public affairs enjoy Charter protection, and restrictions upon those activities must conform to recognized human-rights standards.

The African Commission’s decision in SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria further reinforces the proposition that states bear responsibilities not merely to refrain from violating rights but to create conditions within which rights can meaningfully be exercised. Civic participation requires more than formal guarantees; it requires institutions and spaces within which dialogue may occur.

An All Southern Cameroons Conference can therefore be viewed as a mechanism of peaceful democratic engagement rather than as inherently confrontational political activity. Its value lies not only in what it may ultimately decide, but in providing a structured forum within which citizens may deliberate without violence, intimidation, or pressure to reach predetermined conclusions.

Representation and Legitimacy

The legitimacy of any Conference must derive from the people it claims to represent and from the procedures through which representation is established.

This makes Dr. Fontem’s proposal for representation through the thirteen divisions particularly significant. A credible institution cannot simply assemble prominent individuals and assume that prominence constitutes democratic legitimacy. Legitimacy requires identifiable constituencies, transparent procedures, and accountable representation.

The thirteen-division framework provides a territorial foundation for participation while avoiding the tendency to reduce Southern Cameroons politics to a binary North West-South West contest. Traditional authorities, women, youth, civil-society organizations, professionals, political movements, religious communities, business interests, and the diaspora should all have meaningful avenues of participation.

The objective should be representation without capture and inclusion without surrendering institutional authority to personalities.

The broader African democratic framework supports these principles. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance commits States Parties to democracy, constitutionalism, popular participation, political pluralism, dialogue, and inclusive governance. These principles strengthen the normative case for a representative Conference capable of facilitating broad-based political engagement.

Government Authorization and the Exercise of Rights

Government approval should not be confused with the source of the underlying rights to expression, association, and assembly.

At the same time, the African Charter does not create an unlimited right to assemble under any circumstances. Article 10 recognizes that freedom of association may be regulated by law. Article 11 similarly permits restrictions prescribed by law and justified by legitimate public interests.

The proper legal distinction is therefore between regulation of the exercise of a right and denial of the right itself.

The proposed Conference should operate peacefully, transparently, and consistently with applicable domestic law and the rights of others. Its legitimacy should not depend entirely upon governmental endorsement. Conversely, organizers should not assume that the existence of protected rights eliminates ordinary legal obligations relating to organization, security, or public order.

The relevant legal question is whether regulatory measures facilitate the orderly exercise of rights or effectively extinguish them. Human-rights jurisprudence consistently favours the former and scrutinizes the latter.

The Conference May Be Convened Electronically

There is no compelling reason why a Conference must physically assemble in a single location to possess institutional legitimacy.

Contemporary legal systems increasingly recognize electronic communications, electronic records, electronic signatures, and digitally authenticated consent as legally significant means of conducting transactions, documenting decisions, and preserving evidence.

Cameroon has incorporated these principles into its domestic legal framework through Law No. 2010/021 of 21 December 2010 regulating electronic commerce and Law No. 2010/013 of 21 December 2010 governing electronic communications. Those enactments recognize the legal significance of electronic communications and electronic records.

These statutes do not specifically regulate political conferences or constitutional assemblies. Nevertheless, they reflect a broader legislative recognition that electronic communications, electronic authentication, and digital records may generate legally recognizable effects. By analogy, they support the procedural validity of electronically conducted institutional processes, provided reliable mechanisms exist for participation, authentication, voting, record integrity, and consent.

Accordingly, notices, accreditation documents, mandates, agendas, minutes, resolutions, and voting records may be generated, transmitted, authenticated, and preserved electronically, subject to applicable legal requirements.

Secure electronic participation would allow delegates from the thirteen divisions, the diaspora, and other constituencies to participate without incurring the financial, logistical, and security burdens associated with a single physical gathering.

The critical issue is not whether delegates occupy the same room. The decisive question is whether the institutional framework reliably establishes identity, representation, quorum, participation, voting procedures, consent, and record integrity.

An electronically convened Conference should therefore include:

• authenticated delegate registration;
• reliable identity verification;
• transparent voting mechanisms;
• verified quorum procedures;
• authenticated minutes and resolutions; and
• secure archival preservation of records.

Electronic participation does not itself confer authority upon the Conference or transform its resolutions into binding legal instruments. The authority of any resolution derives from the Conference’s constitutive mandate, the powers delegated to representatives, the procedures adopted by participants, and the legal consequences assigned to those decisions.

Electronic form creates a means of governance; it does not create political legitimacy. Legitimacy must still arise from representation, procedure, accountability, and consent.

A Neutral Forum for Competing Constitutional Visions

The Conference’s greatest political value may lie in its capacity to provide a neutral institutional forum within which competing constitutional perspectives may coexist.

Proponents of federalism should be able to advocate federal arrangements. Advocates of confederal models should be free to advance their proposals. Proponents of independence should be equally free to argue their position. Other constitutional alternatives should likewise receive a hearing.

Participants need not agree on the destination before agreeing on the necessity of dialogue.

The Conference should therefore function as a mechanism for deliberation rather than an instrument for manufacturing consensus. Such an approach is fully consistent with the African Charter’s protections of expression, association, assembly, and participation, as well as with the broader African commitment to political pluralism, tolerance, and democratic engagement.

From Political Mobilization to Institutional Legitimacy*

Perhaps the most important lesson of the AAC experience, and one that underlies Dr. Fontem’s thesis, is that political mobilization alone is insufficient without durable institutions.

A Conference should establish procedures for representation, decision-making, accountability, succession, consultation, and review. No individual or organization should possess ownership of the collective political project.

Government appointments should not create political constituencies. Organizational changes in political strategy should not permit any single group to redefine the mandate of the broader community. Individuals are temporary custodians of political mandates; the mandate itself belongs to the people.

Institutionalization transforms political competition from a contest for personal supremacy into competition through ideas, arguments, and accountable representation. It also provides resilience against the inevitable changes in personalities and political circumstances.

The African Court Dimension

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides an additional interpretive framework for understanding the rights implicated by the proposed Conference.

Cameroon deposited its instrument of ratification of the Protocol establishing the African Court on 17 August 2015. However, ratification of the Protocol is legally distinct from the declaration contemplated by Article 34(6) accepting the Court’s competence to receive applications directly from individuals and qualifying non-governmental organizations.

Cameroon has ratified the Protocol but has not deposited an Article 34(6) declaration. Consequently, the procedural avenues available for direct individual litigation before the Court remain limited.

This distinction is important and should not be blurred. Nevertheless, the Court’s jurisprudence remains highly persuasive in interpreting Charter rights. Decisions such as Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Rwanda, Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso, and APDH v. Côte d’Ivoire provide valuable guidance concerning freedom of expression, political participation, democratic governance, and civic space.

Conclusion

An All Southern Cameroons Conference is legally defensible and politically significant as a mechanism for peaceful association, participation, representation, and collective deliberation.

Its legal foundation lies in the African Charter’s protections of freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and political participation, complemented by the Charter’s recognition of peoples’ rights and self-determination. Properly understood, self-determination includes not merely the right to advocate particular constitutional outcomes but also the right of a people collectively to deliberate concerning those outcomes.

Whether conducted physically, electronically, or through a hybrid model, a properly constituted Conference can provide a lawful and credible institutional framework for democratic engagement, provided that its procedures ensure representation, authentication, transparency, accountability, and procedural integrity.

Ultimately, the Conference’s greatest value may not lie in any specific constitutional conclusion. Its significance lies in creating a peaceful, inclusive, representative, and durable institutional space in which competing constitutional visions may be debated, political grievances articulated, and collective political agency exercised through transparent and accountable democratic processes.

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McFarlane Njoh is a lawyer, social justice advocate and legal and political analyst

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Footnotes

1. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, arts. 9, 10, 11, 13, 19 and 20.
2. African Charter, art. 9.
3. African Charter, art. 10.
4. African Charter, art. 11.
5. African Charter, art. 13.
6. Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, Communications Nos. 147/95 and 149/96 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 11 May 2000), finding violations of, inter alia, Articles 9, 10, 11 and 20 of the African Charter.
7. Ibid.
8. Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Communications Nos. 140/94, 141/94 and 145/95 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights).
9. African Charter, arts. 19 and 20.
10. African Charter, art. 20(1).
11. The African Commission has consistently interpreted the Charter as protecting both individual and collective dimensions of political participation and self-determination. See generally Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Communication No. 75/92 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights).
12. African Charter, art. 13.
13. Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Rwanda, Application No. 003/2014, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Judgment of 24 November 2017, holding that restrictions on political expression must satisfy requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality.
14. Ibid.
15. Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso, Application No. 004/2013, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Judgment of 5 December 2014.
16. Ibid.
17. Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights).
18. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted 30 January 2007, arts. 2, 3 and 27.
19. Ibid., arts. 2 and 3.
20. Ibid., art. 27.
21. African Charter, arts. 10 and 11.
22. Law No. 2010/021 of 21 December 2010 Regulating Electronic Commerce in Cameroon, particularly arts. 9 and 10.
23. Law No. 2010/013 of 21 December 2010 Governing Electronic Communications in Cameroon.
24. Law No. 2010/021, arts. 9–10.
25. African Charter, arts. 9, 10, 11 and 13.
26. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 9 June 1998, art. 34(6).
27. The Republic of Cameroon deposited its instrument of ratification of the Protocol on 17 August 2015. The African Court’s official records indicate that Cameroon has ratified the Protocol but has not made the declaration contemplated by Article 34(6) permitting direct access by individuals and qualifying NGOs.
28. Protocol Establishing the African Court, art. 34(6).
29. Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH) v. Côte d’Ivoire, Application No. 001/2014, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Judgment of 18 November 2016.
30. See generally Jawara v. The Gambia; Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Rwanda; Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso; and APDH v. Côte d’Ivoire.
31. See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995); James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006). These authorities distinguish between the principle of self-determination and the separate question of whether a particular people possess a legal entitlement to external self-determination in the form of statehood or secession.