Saturday 19 Sept. 2026
ENVISIONING AN ALL SOUTHERN CAMEROONS CONFERENCE
–Lessons We Must Learn From the AACs
Fontem Neba, PhD
Scholar, Critic & Political and Civil Rights Advocate
Abstract — Part II
This article, Part II of a three-part series extracted from the author’s forthcoming book, examines the potential obstacles facing a proposed All Southern Cameroons Conference if or when it has to hold and the institutional safeguards required to protect it. Drawing lessons from AAC I and AAC II, the article argues that unity alone cannot guarantee sustainable collective political action. Government interference, elite competition, political appointments, regional rivalry, financial dependence, leadership disputes, and external pressure must be anticipated and addressed at the institutional-design stage. It proposes a permanent Conference, rather than a one-time event, supported by transparent rules for representation, leadership succession, finances, decision-making, and accountability. The article further advocates electronic consultation as a contingency where physical assembly is obstructed, while maintaining legitimate and inclusive representation through the thirteen divisions. Above all, it argues that political appointments should affect individuals, not constituencies, and that the Conference must remain stronger than its leaders.
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Part II — Anticipating Obstacles and Protecting the Conference
Introduction
The history of AAC I and AAC II teaches two complementary lessons. First, the people of the former Southern Cameroons are capable of coming together around a common political purpose. Second, collective political action can be weakened when its institutions are not sufficiently protected against internal competition, external interference and the changing political interests of individual leaders.
A new All Southern Cameroons Conference must therefore be designed with the assumption that it will face resistance. The greatest mistake would be to establish the Conference first and only afterward begin asking how it should respond to political interference, elite competition or government appointments. These questions must be addressed at the foundation of the institution.
The Conference should not be constructed around the expectation that every participant will always act in the collective interest. Institutions exist precisely because individual interests sometimes diverge from collective interests. The objective is consequently not to find perfect leaders but to establish rules that make destructive behavior difficult, political disagreement manageable and institutional continuity possible.
The Conference must be capable of surviving the departure of individuals, the emergence of competing political organizations with disruptive intent, government pressure and disagreement over political strategy. Its strength must derive from its mandate and procedures rather than from the personal authority of its leaders.
Expecting Political Interference
A territory-wide political conference dealing with the future of the former Southern Cameroons is unlikely to operate in a political vacuum. The government may regard such an initiative as politically sensitive, particularly if it develops a coherent collective mandate. The experience surrounding AAC I and AAC II demonstrates that collective political organization can attract organized opposition.
The proposed Anglophone General Conference associated with Cardinal Christian Tumi provides another important lesson. The government’s refusal to permit the proposed gathering demonstrated the vulnerability of a political initiative that depends upon physical assembly in circumstances where authorities can prevent such a gathering.
A new Conference should therefore distinguish between the right to organize politically and the practical ability to assemble physically. If a physical meeting is obstructed, the political process should not automatically collapse.
The Conference must be designed from the beginning with alternative channels of consultation and deliberation. Physical meetings should remain important, but they should form only one component of a larger institutional structure.
Can an All Southern Cameroons Conference Meet Electronically?
An electronic Conference is both conceivable and potentially useful. Modern communications technology permits representatives from the thirteen divisions and the diaspora to deliberate without being physically assembled in one location. This could significantly reduce the ability of any authority to prevent all forms of collective consultation simply by blocking one physical venue.
Electronic organization also offers other advantages. It can reduce travel costs, permit participation by people living abroad, facilitate documentation and allow the Conference to operate through several stages rather than one highly visible gathering.
However, an online meeting by itself does not constitute a representative Conference. The critical issue remains the legitimacy of the delegates. Each division must establish its representatives through transparent procedures before those representatives participate electronically.
The electronic model should therefore be regarded as an institutional capability, not merely a technological convenience. If physical meetings become impossible, the Conference should be able to continue its work through verified online meetings, written submissions, consultations and other lawful communication mechanisms.
At the same time, digital exclusion, poor connectivity, misinformation, identity verification and cybersecurity must be addressed. The objective should be to create a system in which technology expands participation without allowing technological advantages to determine political representation.
A Conference Must Have a Permanent Institutional Identity
One of the most important safeguards is to ensure that the Conference is an institution rather than an event. AAC I and AAC II were historically significant gatherings, but the failure to consolidate their achievements into an enduring structure created an institutional vacuum.
The new Conference should therefore have a constitution, permanent administrative organs, defined membership rules, procedures for accreditation, financial regulations, decision-making rules and mechanisms for leadership succession.
This distinction matters because an event can be disrupted once; an institution can recover. A government may prevent a physical conference from taking place on a particular date, but it should not thereby be able to eliminate the institution’s capacity to consult its constituencies. The Conference should consequently be capable of postponing, relocating, dividing its proceedings into stages or moving portions of its work online without losing its institutional identity.
The Problem of Political Appointments
One of the most difficult questions concerns what happens when a prominent member of the Conference receives a government appointment. This possibility should be anticipated rather than treated as an exceptional betrayal, even though the government could well hatch such a plot in the hope of dismembering the Conference.
A government appointment should not automatically mean that an individual has acted improperly, even though accepting the appointment clearly means relegating collective interest to second place. A person may genuinely believe that entering government provides an opportunity to serve the public or advance the interests of his or her constituency. The Conference should therefore avoid creating a political culture in which every appointment is automatically interpreted as treachery.
At the same time, holding public office may create a conflict of interest if the individual continues to exercise executive authority within an independent political institution whose purpose is to represent a collective constituency.
The appropriate response is institutional rather than personal. A member who accepts a significant government appointment should normally relinquish an executive, representational or decision-making role within the Conference while remaining eligible, where appropriate, to participate as an ordinary member.
The principle should be clear: no individual should simultaneously control both sides of a political negotiation.
What Happens to the Divisional Mandate?
A government appointment should affect the individual, not the constituency. If a delegate from a particular division accepts government office, that division should not lose its representation in the Conference.
The division should have a predetermined procedure for replacing the delegate or appointing another person to exercise the mandate. This prevents the government from indirectly weakening the Conference simply by recruiting one of its prominent participants.
The principle is particularly important because political appointments can be attractive precisely because they remove influential individuals from collective movements. If every appointment creates an institutional crisis, the appointment itself becomes a political weapon.
A properly designed Conference should make that strategy ineffective. Individuals may change political positions; constituencies should not lose their institutional voice.
Preventing Elite Capture
The Conference will inevitably attract influential people. Former government officials, politicians, lawyers, academics, traditional authorities, religious leaders, businesspeople and diaspora professionals may all possess valuable experience. Their participation should be welcomed, but their prominence must not automatically translate into control.
The first safeguard should be a distinction between participation and authority. Anyone capable of contributing constructively should be able to participate in appropriate forums. Formal decision-making authority, however, should depend upon a defined mandate.
No individual should control accreditation, the agenda, finances, communications and decision-making simultaneously. Institutional responsibilities should be distributed among different organs and subject to oversight.
Leadership positions should have defined terms and should be subject to rotation. The purpose is not to exclude experienced leaders but to prevent the Conference from becoming permanently identified with one personality. The Conference must be larger and stronger than its most famous participants.
Preventing Disruptive Competition Among Southern Cameroons Elites
Elite competition cannot be eliminated, and attempting to eliminate it would be unrealistic. The objective should instead be to prevent competition from becoming destructive.
Several rules can help. Delegates should have clearly defined mandates. Major decisions should require collective approval. Leadership positions should rotate. Financial resources should be independently monitored. Conflicts of interest should be disclosed. Unauthorized individuals should not be permitted to speak officially for the Conference.
The thirteen-division framework provides an additional safeguard. It prevents the institutional structure from being reduced to a competition between two regional blocs. Committees should include members from different divisions, and major decisions should require support extending across geographical constituencies.
The Conference should also establish procedures for resolving disputes before disagreements become crises. Mediation, internal appeals and independent review should be available.
The goal is to transform political competition from a struggle for control into a competition of ideas.
De-emphasizing the North West–South West Binary
The thirteen divisions should be the primary territorial units of representation precisely because the previous regional binary proved vulnerable to political manipulation.
This does not mean denying the historical significance of the North West and South West. Those identities are part of the history and social reality of the territory. But they should not become the principal institutional framework through which political authority is distributed.
A divisional system gives every part of the territory an identifiable political space. A smaller division is not required to align automatically with a larger regional bloc simply to protect its interests. It can negotiate directly within the common institution.
The result should be a political culture in which a disagreement between two divisions does not automatically become a North West–South West confrontation.
Transparency and Public Accountability
Transparency should be one of the Conference’s strongest defenses against manipulation. Secretive political organizations inevitably generate suspicion, particularly in a political environment marked by accusations of betrayal and government influence.
The Conference should therefore establish clear rules concerning accreditation, leadership, finances, decision-making and public communication. Major resolutions should be documented, and financial contributions and expenditures should be subject to appropriate oversight.
Transparency does not mean that every internal discussion must be made public. Sensitive matters may sometimes require confidentiality. But confidentiality should be justified by a legitimate institutional reason rather than used to conceal decisions from the constituencies represented.
A transparent institution is more difficult for individuals to capture because its actions can be evaluated against established rules.
Financial Independence
Financial dependence creates political vulnerability. If one individual, organization or government becomes the principal source of funding, that actor may acquire disproportionate influence.
The Conference should therefore establish diversified sources of legitimate funding. Contributions from individuals, community organizations, professional groups and the diaspora could be accepted under transparent rules. No contribution should confer additional voting rights or political authority.
The Conference should operate through an approved budget and independent financial oversight. Major expenditures should be authorized according to established procedures.
Financial independence is therefore not merely an administrative matter. It is an essential component of political independence.
A Code of Conduct
Every delegate should agree to a code of conduct. The code should establish minimum standards concerning respectful debate, conflicts of interest, institutional confidentiality, use of Conference resources and public representation.
It should prohibit intimidation, deliberate misinformation, unauthorized commitments on behalf of the Conference and the use of institutional positions primarily for personal political campaigns.
Disciplinary procedures should be independent and fair. The purpose should not be to suppress disagreement. A healthy institution must permit strong criticism and competing ideas. The purpose is to prevent disagreements from becoming personal campaigns to destroy the institution. The Conference should be able to debate vigorously without becoming dysfunctional.
Leadership Succession and Institutional Continuity
No leader should be indispensable. This principle must be embedded in the Conference’s structure from the beginning.
Every major office should have a defined term and a clear process for replacement. The same should apply to divisional representatives. A delegate who resigns, accepts government office, becomes incapacitated or otherwise leaves the Conference should be replaceable without reopening the entire institutional question.
Succession rules also reduce the temptation for leaders to use resignation as a weapon. If departure does not threaten institutional survival, political disagreements become easier to manage. The essential principle is simple: people come and go; the mandate remains.
The Conference Must Be Able to Negotiate Without Being Captured
The ultimate test of institutional independence will be the Conference’s relationship with the government. The objective should not be permanent confrontation. If a peaceful political settlement is possible, negotiation must remain available.
But negotiation must be conducted institutionally. No individual should be able to negotiate away the collective mandate without authorization. No government appointment should automatically confer authority to speak for the Conference. No development project should purchase political allegiance. No external sponsor should determine the political position of the institution.
The Conference should be willing to engage government, but it must know who has the authority to negotiate, what mandate that person possesses and what decisions require wider approval.
A collective political institution is meaningful only when it can negotiate without surrendering its institutional autonomy.
Conclusion
The greatest lesson from AAC I and AAC II is that unity cannot depend upon goodwill alone. Political institutions must anticipate the pressures that will test them. Government opposition, political appointments, elite competition, regional rivalry, financial dependence and leadership disputes are foreseeable challenges rather than unexpected accidents.
A new All Southern Cameroons Conference should therefore be designed as a permanent institution rather than a single event. The thirteen divisions should provide its territorial foundation, while transparent rules should determine representation, leadership, finances and decision-making.
The Conference should also possess the ability to function electronically if physical assembly is obstructed. A government may be able to prevent people from gathering at a particular place, but it should not be able to extinguish an institution that has multiple lawful means of consultation.
Most importantly, the Conference must ensure that political appointments affect individuals rather than constituencies. A leader may enter government, but the division he or she represents must remain represented. Elite competition may occur, but it must be channeled through rules rather than allowed to destroy the institution.
The central lesson is therefore clear: the Conference must be stronger than its leaders, more enduring than its political circumstances, and more important than the ambitions of any individual or group. Only then can the challenges of AAC I and AAC II become a lesson rather than a recurring pattern. I hope to lay out how this can be achieved in Part III.
(Extracted from my forthcoming book, Understanding The Southern Cameroons Question: Identity, Grievances and the Search for a Sustainable Future).
Part III is here.
