Wednesday 23 September 2026
ENVISIONING AN ALL SOUTHERN CAMEROONS CONFERENCE
— Lessons We Must Learn from the AACs.
Fontem Neba, PhD
Scholar, Critic & Political and Civil Rights Advocate
Abstract – III
This third paper advances an institutional framework for constituting a new All Southern Cameroons Conference capable of achieving representative legitimacy, political coherence, and long-term institutional sustainability. Drawing critically on the lessons of AAC I and AAC II, it argues that the principal challenge is no longer the capacity to articulate a common political aspiration, but the creation of durable institutions capable of accommodating internal diversity, political disagreement, external pressure, and leadership transition. The proposed model begins with structured consultations across the thirteen divisions and establishes an independent Preparatory Commission to guarantee transparent representation, accreditation, and procedural integrity. It further advocates inclusive participation by women, youth, traditional authorities, civil society, professionals, political organizations, and the diaspora, alongside robust minority protections and accountable decision-making. Particular attention is given to institutional resilience where physical assembly is restricted, including secure electronic participation and a permanent professional Secretariat. The paper ultimately contends that sustainable political unity must be institutionalized rather than personalized.
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Part III — Constituting the Conference and Building a Sustainable Political Mandate
Introduction
It is clear that the central question, after examining the lessons of AAC I and AAC II, is no longer whether the people of the former Southern Cameroons can develop a common political platform. They have demonstrated that capacity before. The more difficult question is how a new All Southern Cameroons Conference can be constituted so that it is sufficiently representative, institutionally credible and resilient to survive the pressures that weakened earlier initiatives.
The answer requires a process rather than a single event. The Conference should:
- emerge from consultations within the thirteen divisions,
- draw legitimacy from clearly defined constituencies,
- establish transparent procedures before major political decisions are taken,
- and create institutions capable of continuing after the initial gathering.
The Conference should also recognize the realities of the contemporary political environment. Physical assembly may be restricted. Participants may disagree about political objectives. Some delegates may subsequently enter government as it has often been the practice. Others may withdraw or form competing organizations. The diaspora may play a major role. None of these circumstances should be capable of obstructing or destroying the institution or the people’s resolve to work together.
The objective should therefore be to create a political mechanism that can accommodate disagreement without losing its common purpose. Its legitimacy should derive from representation, procedure and accountability rather than from the prominence of its individual leaders.
1. From Consultation to Conference
The first stage should be a broad consultation rather than an immediate attempt to convene a grand political gathering. Each of the thirteen divisions should have an opportunity to identify its principal political, social, economic, cultural and institutional concerns.
These consultations should not be restricted to political elites. They should involve traditional authorities, women, youth, professionals, religious institutions, civil society organizations, business communities, political actors and ordinary citizens. *The purpose should be to discover both the different needs of divisions and the issues that are common to them.
Each division should then develop a written statement of priorities following a given template. These statements would provide the raw material for the territory-wide Conference. The process would consequently begin with local concerns rather than imposing a predetermined political programme from above.
This approach would also provide an important test of the divisional framework. If a common political project is to be credible, it must demonstrate that it can accommodate the concerns of both large and small communities.
2. Establishing an Independent Preparatory Commission
A Preparatory Commission should be established to coordinate the consultations and prepare the Conference. Its legitimacy would be critical because the body organizing the Conference could otherwise become a source of political controversy.
The Commission should therefore be composed of individuals with demonstrable credibility and broad geographic and professional diversity. No individual should control its membership or agenda.
Its mandate should be strictly defined. It should:
- organize consultations,
- establish accreditation procedures,
- prepare draft rules,
- coordinate communications and
- determine the practical arrangements for the Conference.
It should not decide substantive political questions on behalf of the Conference.
This distinction is essential. The Commission should be the servant of the Conference, not its political substitute.
The Commission should also publish its procedures so that communities understand how delegates will be selected and how decisions will be made. Transparency at this stage would help prevent accusations that the Conference was designed to serve a predetermined political faction or agenda.
3. Representation of the Thirteen Divisions
Each division should have guaranteed representation. The exact number of delegates and structure of delegations could be determined through consultation, but the system should avoid allowing population size or financial power alone to determine political influence.
A possible structure would combine equal divisional representation with additional representation for population or special constituencies. This would ensure that smaller divisions cannot simply be overwhelmed while recognizing that larger populations may reasonably expect greater representation.
The important principle is that every division must possess a meaningful voice. No geographical area should feel that it is merely attending a Conference whose political decisions have already been made elsewhere.
Representation should, as much as possible, also be balanced by gender, generation and social background. A Conference dominated exclusively by older male political elites would reproduce the limitations of previous political structures.
4. The Role of the Diaspora
The diaspora should have a significant but carefully defined role. Southern Cameroonians living outside the territory possess substantial professional, financial and intellectual resources and have become important participants in political debates.
However, diaspora participation should complement rather than replace territorial representation. Those living in the diaspora should not acquire disproportionate authority simply because electronic communication makes their participation easier.
The Conference could integrate the diaspora component in a way that serves the thirteen divisions as the foundation of territorial representation. This would recognize the diaspora’s contribution while creating a new form of political balance.
The same principle should apply to international professionals, academics and other experts. Expertise should be welcomed, but
expertise should not automatically become political authority.
5. Representation of Women and Youth
Women and young people should not be treated as symbolic participants. They should have guaranteed representation within the Conference and its committees.
A political institution that claims to represent the future cannot be structured exclusively by those who dominated politics in the past. Women have historically carried substantial social and economic responsibilities within Southern Cameroons communities, while young people will live longest with the consequences of whatever political settlement eventually emerges.
Their participation should therefore include meaningful decision-making roles rather than ceremonial positions.
6. Developing the Conference Charter
Before the substantive political deliberations begin, the Conference should adopt a Charter establishing its institutional principles.
The Charter should define the Conference’s purpose, membership, representation, leadership, decision-making procedures, financial rules, conflict-of-interest provisions, disciplinary procedures and relationship with external organizations.
It should also establish the boundaries of individual authority. No delegate should be able to bind the Conference to an agreement without authorization.
The Charter should be difficult to amend casually. Fundamental changes should require a particularly broad consensus, perhaps including support from a substantial proportion of the thirteen divisions.
This would protect the institution from being redirected by a temporary majority or a powerful individual.
7. Decision-Making: Consensus Without Paralysis
Consensus should be the preferred method for major decisions, but unanimity should not become a requirement for every issue. Requiring every division or individual to agree would allow a small minority to paralyze the institution.
The Conference should therefore establish different thresholds for different categories of decisions. Routine procedural matters could be decided by ordinary majority. Major political positions could require a broader majority and support across a minimum number of divisions. Fundamental constitutional or institutional questions could require an even higher threshold.
This approach recognizes that unity and unanimity are not the same thing. A legitimate institution must be able to disagree and still function.
8. The Question of Political Objectives
One of the most sensitive questions will be the Conference’s substantive political objective. Participants may support different constitutional arrangements, including greater decentralization, federalism, confederation, independence or other forms of political settlement.
The Conference should not predetermine the answer before its constituencies have been consulted. Its legitimacy will depend upon allowing the people represented to deliberate openly.
The initial objective should therefore be to establish the process through which the collective position is determined. The Conference should create the conditions for informed political choice rather than manufacture consensus.
This is particularly important because a political settlement imposed by elites would reproduce the very problem the Conference is intended to solve.
9. Protecting Minority Views
A territory-wide Conference should not become a mechanism through which a majority can simply impose its will on minorities. Divisions and social groups which cut across Divisions must have confidence that their fundamental interests will not be sacrificed.
The Charter should therefore protect minority rights and permit dissenting positions to be recorded. Delegates should be able to disagree with a decision and propose a debatable alternative without being accused of disloyalty to the collective cause.
A mature political institution does not require everyone to think alike. It requires people to accept legitimate procedures for resolving disagreement. This is particularly important for consolidating trust among communities.
10. Engagement With the Government
The Conference should prepare for government engagement without becoming dependent upon government recognition. Its legitimacy should come from its constituencies, not simply from whether the government approves its existence. One of the ways of weakening the Conference is for the government to attempt to snub, disregard or even make it pariah. That will be a sign that the people are on the right path.
At the same time, the Conference should remain open to peaceful dialogue with the government. Its purpose should ultimately be to create a credible mechanism through which political grievances can be addressed.
Any government engagement should occur through designated representatives acting under an explicit mandate. Private negotiations by individual leaders or political elites should not be presented as agreements of the Conference or the people of the Southern Cameroons.
If government offers concessions, the Conference should have procedures for evaluating them collectively through a determined process. If negotiations fail, the institution should remain intact.
The objective should be neither unconditional confrontation nor unconditional accommodation, but mandated political engagement.
11. What If the Government Blocks the Conference?
The possibility of government obstruction should be incorporated into the institutional design from the beginning. If authorities prevent a physical gathering, the Conference should not interpret that as the end of the process.
The preparatory work can continue through divisional consultations, written submissions and electronic meetings. Delegates can deliberate in smaller groups. Committees can continue their work remotely. The eventual Conference can be convened electronically when sufficient preparations have been done, if circumstances do not still permit a physical meeting.
An electronic Conference may therefore serve as a contingency mechanism as well as a primary method of participation.
The crucial principle is that a government should not possess a veto over whether citizens can communicate with one another.
Where lawful and safe, electronic organization can make collective consultation more resilient. It can also connect participants who are geographically separated and allow the institution to maintain continuity during periods of political restriction.
12. The Electronic Conference and Its Limitations
Electronic participation should nevertheless be approached carefully. The Conference must address authentication, digital access, privacy, cybersecurity, connectivity and record-keeping.
Delegates should be verified before participating in formal votes. Important decisions should be recorded and archived. Where electronic voting is used, the system should provide reasonable safeguards against impersonation or manipulation.
At the same time, no technological system should be treated as infallible. The Conference should maintain alternative procedures for participants who cannot reliably access digital platforms.
The electronic model should therefore be hybrid rather than exclusively digital. Physical consultations, divisional meetings, written submissions and electronic deliberations can reinforce one another.
13. A Permanent Secretariat
After the Conference is established, it should create a professional Secretariat responsible for administration rather than political leadership.
The Secretariat should maintain records, coordinate meetings, preserve the institutional archive, manage communications and support the various committees.
Its staff should be selected according to competence rather than political loyalty. The Secretariat should serve successive leaderships rather than become an instrument of whichever faction controls the Conference at a particular moment.
Institutional memory is especially important. The failures of earlier initiatives should be documented, as should the decisions and experiences of the new Conference. Future generations should not have to reconstruct the institutional history from personal recollections.
14. Measuring Success
The Conference should establish measurable indicators of success. These should include the breadth of participation, the degree of divisional representation, transparency of finances, implementation of decisions, public confidence and the ability to maintain institutional continuity.
Success should not be measured simply by whether a declaration is adopted or whether prominent political figures attend. It is not supposed to be a popularity contest, but an opportunity for the people of the Southern Cameroons to articulate their concerns and designs a collective vision.
A Conference that produces a powerful declaration but collapses six months later has achieved less than one that develops a durable institution capable of sustained political engagement.
The real measure should be whether the Conference increases the collective political capacity of the people it represents.
15. The Long-Term Vision
The ultimate objective should be to transform the culture of Southern Cameroons political organization from personality-based politics to institution-based politics.
The history of the past demonstrates the limitations of relying upon individual access to government. A prominent politician may open a door in Yaoundé, but that door can close when the politician leaves office or dies. An institution, by contrast, can preserve a collective mandate across generations and speak for everyone anywhere in the world.
The thirteen divisions provide a practical foundation for such institution-building. They allow local identities and interests to be represented without creating factions. They create multiple centers of political legitimacy while preserving one common framework.
This is the central promise of the new Conference: not to eliminate difference, but to make difference politically useful.
Conclusion
To sum up, a new All Southern Cameroons Conference should be conceived not as another political gathering but as an attempt to correct the institutional weaknesses revealed by AAC I and AAC II. Its legitimacy should begin at the divisional level and rise upward through a
transparent process of consultation and representation.
The thirteen divisions should provide the territorial foundation, while women, youth, traditional authorities, civil society, professionals, political organizations and the diaspora should contribute to a broad and inclusive political process.
The Conference must also anticipate adversity. Government obstruction should not be allowed to end the process. Electronic participation should provide continuity when physical assembly is difficult, while clear procedures should protect the institution from digital manipulation and exclusion.
Political appointments should affect individuals, not constituencies. Leaders should be replaceable. Financial resources should be transparent. Major decisions should require broad support. Minority views should be protected. Negotiations with government should occur only under an explicit institutional mandate.
The ultimate test will be whether the Conference can survive the very pressures that destroyed or weakened earlier collective initiatives. If it can, then AAC I and AAC II will have served their most important historical purpose: teaching a new generation not simply how to unite, but how to build institutions capable of preserving that unity.
The challenge before the people of the former Southern Cameroons is therefore not merely to convene another conference. It is to create a political institution that belongs to the people, represents all thirteen divisions, survives its leaders and provides a credible peaceful mechanism through which a common future can be debated and pursued.
Extracted from my book, Understanding The Southern Cameroons Question: Identity, Grievances and the Search for a Sustainable Future)
